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Maltese Migration: 
A Critique of two views 
by E. P. Delia 
The year 1984 may have started a new phase in the international 
migration movement of Maltese. It registered the lowest number of 
emigrants and return migrants in a year - 629 and 654 respectively - for 
the past forty years and thus yielded, practically, a net emigration of zero. 
This latter result rendered operative one of the basic assumptions 
underlying population projections in the Maltese Islands introduced by 
government economic planners in 19771• If this condition persists 
throughout the eighties, the Maltese population will grow at about 0.9% 
annually, that is, at the average rate of natural increase for the past 
years. 
The implications of the emerging demographic tendencies for 
economic growth and social welfare could be far reaching. The present 
generation of Maltese has been brought up in a socio-economic 
environment which permitted international migration to developed 
countries with relative ease. Insularity did not deter the programmed 
search for employment abroad. Consequently, the tight restrictions on 
the international mobility of Maltese could be expected to induce different 
social and economic reactions to local conditions, particularly in the 
labour market, from those observed to date. Hence, it is opportune to 
evaluate the present popular views of migration and to assess critically 
past migration policies. This exercise need, in turn, be followed up by the 
identification and, possibly, the quantification of the effects of the 
prevailing demographic changes on the size and the composition of the 
population, economic activity and human welfare in the Maltese Islands. 
Discussion on migration in Malta has generally focused on the relative 
merits of emigration. Return migration has, until recently, been 
neglected in public debates and in academic research2• Quite expectedly, 
opinions on migration's role change with the times. Yet it seems that a 
core of views presently attracts a wide consensus. These views have been 
synthesised in a recent study as follows:3 
"Emigration, of course, is another form of conditional retreat 
which at one time had become institutionalized. However, as a 
potential threat to the maintenance of the social structure it has 
never been unequivocally accepted as a solution to the chronic 
problems of overpopulation and unemployment. Emigration -
though widespread - was at best regarded as a necessary evil and is 
now rejected by local political leaders. It is equated with exile from 
the Maltese way of life." 
Such views on emigration give rise to, at least, three observations. 
First, there may exist the illusion in Malta that--emigration is subject to 
local controls. This may be true in the sense that if the domestic socio-
economic environment is judged relatively attractive, few Maltese would 
consider emigration. Actual emigration, however, is beyond the control of 
the Maltese government unless the passports of Maltese nationals are 
withdrawn. In the case of legal, voluntary, international migration it is 
the recipient country which stipulates the conditions for entry and 
settlement of migrants and not the sending country. Three decades of 
successful emigration on a fairly large scale could have led many to 
down play this critical factor, although the restraints and selectivity 
introduced in the mid-seventies by the recipient countries have once more 
brought this factor to the fore 4 • 
Secondly, it seems that the views of Malt.ese society on migration are 
based on criteria which fail to distinguish clearly between the welfare of 
the migrant and the welfare of the non-migrant populations. To regaJ:d 
emigration as a 'conditional retreat' or as 'an exile from the Maltese way 
of life', for example, implies that the focus of attention is the migrants' 
welfare. On the other hand, to regard emigration as a solution to 
unemployment or as a means of controlling overpopulation implies, 
primarily, an aggregate approach with the maximisation of social 
welfare as the objective. Since the interests of migrants may differ from 
those of the non-migrant population, conclusions reached on the relative 
effectiveness and utility of emigration become dependent on the analysis 
carried out. Official documents on migration in Malta are generally 
economy-oriented; they assess the effects of emigration on the aggregate 
supply of skills, unemployment and foreign exchange earnings. 
Thirdly, it is claimed that 'emigration is now rejected by local political 
leaders' and that emigration 'is equated with exile from the Maltese way 
of life'. The first assertion is factual; its veracity can be established after 
account is taken of the present state of international permanent 
migration movements. The second statement is normative and demands 
close consideration. Local politicians occasionally accuse their political 
opponents of sending Maltese 'in exile' as a result of 'bad political 
decisions', and, thereby, they encourage people to regard emigration in 
this perspective". However, it is important for the analyst to distinguish 
between critical appraisals of past policies and pronouncements aimed at 
strengthening the political base of a party. Of course, the identification of 
the 'beliefs' of policy makers constitutes an important object of analysis 
in itself, but, perhaps, it is more rewarding to evaluate the logical 
consistency of an argument whether it is upheld by policy makers or not. 
In the case in question, it is interesting to assess the rationale for 
claiming that emigration is an 'exile'. 
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In this paper we analyse these two propositions, namely, that 
emigration has been rejected by Maltese political leaders and that 
emigration is an 'exile'. It will be argued, in the first section, that within 
the present international set-up controlling immigration into the 
'traditional' recipient countries, Maltese governments are barred from 
relying on emigration from these Islands to check unemployment or 
population growth. It will be further argued, in part two, that emigration 
should be regarded as a decision by the migrant to invest in his future and 
in the future of his family. Emigration enhances the migrant's 
bargaining powers in the labour market and in society, and, therefore, it 
is incorrect to correlate it with 'exile'. 
Migration Policies in Malta: Past and Present 
Only one main strategy relating emigration to population control, 
political stability and economic. diversification may be identified in 
Malta since 194;). Its purpose was to minimise social tension and, 
thereby, reduce pressure on political leaders who would as a result bein-a 
better position to plan and execute programmes aimed at the 
diversification of the production base in Malta. 
Differences, however, arose in establishing the volume of emigration 
consonant with these objectives. One policy option was a relatively high 
emigration, organized and subsidised by the Maltese government backed 
by active representations with friendly governments to accept Maltese 
emigrants for long term, possibly permanent, settlement. An alternative 
option was to aim for a lower emigration, preferably a selective 
emigration which primarily suited Malta's needs, complemented by an 
investment programme on a wider front and implemented at a faster rate 
than that envisaged under the first option. The capital requirement 
would, of course, be greater under this second proposal. Both options 
anticipated changes in the traditional social perceptions of the family, 
female work outside the home, and international trade earnings. 
The first policy option was implemented in the forties, the early fifties 
and the first half of the sixties. The second was effected in the mid-fifties, 
the late sixties and in the early seventies. The switching of the two policy 
variants reflected, in part, differences in economic thinking and, partly, 
changes in the socio-ecQnomic conditions in the Islands. After 1975, 
political leaders in Malta had really no option at all; emigration 
especially fam.ily migration, was con,strained by the tightening up of 
immigration rules in the traditional recipient countries particularly the 
United Kingdom and Australian. Instead, politicians turned attention to 
return migration. 
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Emigration POllCLeS 
The 1948 Census registered a Maltese population of 306000 which was 
growing at a rate exceeding 2!yh annually. The political leaders of the time 
shared the view, later on expressed by Sir George Schuster in 19t07, that 
it was desirable to contai~ population, possibly even reducing population 
to 250000, and, under existing socio-demographic conditions a high 
annual emigration was neces@ary, though not sufficient, to avoid high 
unemployment over the years in which the economy switched over from a 
state of war to peacetime production. 
Political leaders agreed on three issues, namely, (i) that emigration 
could be an effective tool to countervail structural unemployment and to 
induce the formation of gradual social changes related to family size and 
planning; (ii) that emigration had to result in a high level of settlement 
abroad and, therefore family migration, rather than the emigration of 
single males, was to be encouraged while foreign governments were to be 
exhorted to sponsor this type of migration 8; and, (iii) that emigration had 
to be subsidised from public funds if it were to be nondiscriminatory 
towards low income groups and to attain its objectives. Emigration 
subsidies could be justified on the grounds that social benefits exceeded 
private benefits; in their absence, the 'demand' for emigration would be 
lower .than that considered socially optimal. 
The political parties in government in the decade after 1945 -the Malta 
Labour Party (1948-50), and the Nationalist Party in coalition with Malta 
Workers' Party (1951-55) - acted on these beliefs and succeeded in 
assisting 46000 persons to try settling abroad despite the transport 
shortages faced in the late fortieiland despite the s~tbacks to emigration 
to the United States following the enactment of the McCarren-Walter Bill 
in 1951 which restricted the annual entry of Maltese to one hundred. The 
Malta Labour Party in opposition between 1950 and 1955 adhered to 
these views at least until 19539• 
The economic effects of migration were regarded beneficial for the 
migrant and the non-migrant populations provided that technical 
education was introduced so that the skills which were in demand and 
which might be adversely affected through emigration would be 
replaced. 
Similar views were expressed by a United Nations Mission, headed by 
W. F. Stolper, which visited Malta in 196310. The Mission maintained 
that emigration did not represent a loss to Malta at the time or in the 
foreseeable future. The alternative to emigration was unemployment, 
shown in a redundancy of skilled as well as unskilled labour. Besides, 
emigration created better opportunities for the young people entering the 
markets for new skills demanded by a developing Malta, while 
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emigrants' remittances would partly offset Malta's visible trade deficit 
and would ease pressure on government's expenditure on social welfare. 
The Nationalist Party in government after 1962 adopted the 
emigration strategy proposed by the D.N. Mission, which reflected the 
policies and the stance implemented in the forties and the fifties. They 
also tried, without success, to revive emigration to European countries 
which were at the time demanding contract workers from .the 
Mediterranean. In the 1964-69 Development Plan, drawn up during the 
implementation of the discharges of Maltese from the British Defence 
Establishments, emigration was set at 37500 Jor the quinquennium. 
However, this projection was revised drastically downwards following 
the rapid generation of new employment in Manufacturing, Tourism and 
Construction; net emigration was set at 2400 for the late sixties and for 
the five year period covered by the Third Development Plan (1969-74), 
th~reby switching over to the second policy of lower emigration and 
higher investment. By that time, the rate of natural increase had declined 
from the high of 2.4% yearly of the late forties to q.7% in the sixties. 
This policy option had been initially forwarded and emphasised by 
Thomas Balogh and Dudley Seers in their capacity of advisers to the 
Labour Government in 195511 • They argued for a lower emigration -
500012 instead of 10000 - on the grounds that emigration was an 
expensive and inappropriate solution to Malta's problems. They insisted 
that emigration reduced the supply of skills, meant the loss of the more 
venturesome and adaptable persons and resulted in an inadequate flow 
of remittances. In their view, the Maltese economy would have benefited 
more through investment than through emigration l:l. 
However, though conceptually differing in emphasis from the then-
orthodox vision of emigration, the alternative view proposed by Balogh 
and Seers could not be" tangibly translated into a positive plan of action at 
the time. For these economists realised immediately that instead of 
formulating clear policy guidelines they had only identified and spelled 
out a dilemma: should emigration decline considerably, populatiOl1 
would expand rapidly and, at the rates of natural growth then prevailing, 
it would double in 25 years. To provide jobs, houses, social capital and 
water would demand "a scale of investment quite impracticable at the 
time". Balogh and Seers had to conclude that there was "no obvious 
solution within the present day political or social realities in Malta"14. 
Yet, despite these admonishings about the 'emigration dilemma' their 
thesis was adopted by the Malta Labour P8rty after 1955, perhaps in 
anticipation of an eventual political and economic integration of the 
Maltese Islands with Britain. Sympathisers with this view, however, 
apparently underestimated the critical importance of a prerequisite for 
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the success of this policy option: the rate of in vestment would have to be 
sufficiently high in order to generate a demand for labour to absorb a 
rising labour supply as emigration declined. Investment could, therefore, 
be at a historically high level, yet comparatively low to Hie supply of 
labour on the market in a society which was presuming to induce a 
change in female perceptions for work and an increase in the female 
activity rate simultaneously with a transformation of its production 
base. The Balogh-Seers 'prescription' remained silent on the alternative 
options to be pursued should the actual investment rate fall consistently 
below the desired. It would be meaningless to assert, as Seers did 
recently I -., that emigration can be effectively replaced by a 'dynamic 
strategy'. All strategies are dubbed 'dynamic', in advance, by the 
governments who intend to implement them; but it is only 'ex post' that 
strategies may be critically assessed for their effectiveness through the 
results they achieve. It need hardly be observed that often attainments 
differ, at times substantially, from the projected targets. 
On its reelection to government in 1971, the Labour Party continued 
with the 'low emigration policy' implemented in the late sixties. In the 
Seven Year Development Plan (1973-80), drawn up with the assistance of 
Balogh, among others, the Labour Government projected for an annual 
net emigration of 2500 except in 1974 and 1975 when net emigration was 
expected to be 3500 and 3000 respectively. In aqdition to emigration, and 
not in lieu of it as it is sometimes claimed 11" the Labour Government set 
up the first in a series of short-term employment corps with the aim of 
mopping up part of the excess labour supply. These labour corps were 
apparently the missing 'prescription' should the economic dynamism 
envisaged by Seers and Balogh be found wanting. 
Labour corps are adequate to deal with short-term, cyclical, 
unemployment whereas emigration was principa,lly effective against 
massive structural unemployment. Labour corps and emigration are not 
substitutes; at best, under certain conditions, they may be 
complementary and mutually supporting to check rising unemployment 
as they did in Malta between 1972 and 1974. But labour corps are not the 
appropriate solution when employment problems emanate from a 
chronic shortfall of investment. 
Following the first international oil price increase in 1973, and the 
difficulties which it compounded in many economies, Britain and 
Australia, the two countries which offered settlement to the majority of 
Maltese emigrants, introduced tighter immigration controls. As a result, 
emigration, which had exceeded projections for 1972 and 1973, slumped 
well below the targets for the years after 1974, as may be observed from 
Table 1, and triggered the process outlined by Balogh and Seers in 1955: 
6 
the population and the labour force start to expand and the scale of 
investment would have to be scaled up accordingly. Fortunately, the 
annual population growth is 0.9% at present and not 1.9% as in 1955; at 
the current rate population doubles every 77 years instead of in 39 years 
af the 1955 rate of increase. 
Table 1 
Year Emigration Return Plan Targets for 
Migration Net Emigration 
1971 2798 143 2400 
1972 3163 202 2400 
1973 4059 230 2400 
1974 4189 535 3500 
1975 1624 2957 3000 
1976 1107 2472 2500 
1977 1237 2261 2500 
Source: Demographic Review of the Maltese Islands and Development Plans (1969-74), and 
(1973-80). 
Policies on Return Migration 
Government economic documents after 1974 practically ignore 
emigration. However, they demonstrate a greater sensitivity to return 
migration. Indeed, this factor is cited as one cause inducing the high level 
of unemployment of the eighties. Interest in return migration is officially 
attributed to a phenomenon supposedly identified from Table 1: return 
migrants increased from a few hundreds to well over 2000 after 1974. 
This sudden shift in inward migration after 1974 is, however, primarily 
a statistical illusion. It resulted from the way in which the Office of 
Statistics in Malta defined migrant returnees. Up to 1974 only those 
emigrants who returned within two years of departure were counted in 
migration statistics; since 1975 all returning migrants irrespective of 
their length of settlement abroad are recorded as returnees l7• 
After 1977, the Labour Government introduced restrictions on the 
5(jfifCh for ernDloyrnent and on the freedom to .purchase property in Malta 
for returning migrants, in an attempt to discourage return migration IH. 
These regulations prompted a declaration by the Nationalist Party in its 
clec,or.u.l =«nifesto that "there will be no discrimination between Maltese 
c~b.zens, ~rrespedive of whether they are returned migrants or not"!!). 
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With emigration blocked 20, it was, perhaps, a short-term effective 
decision by Maltese politicians to turn attention to return migration. This 
transfer of interest, however, could not be interpreted as signifying a 
radical change with the past regarding emigration. Emigration is 
presently a latent policy tool which Maltese politicians would exploit to 
the advantage of economic planning whenever an opportunity arises. 
The recent exhortations to Maltese youth by a senior government 
minister to seek employment opportunities in Libya21 , "until government 
succeeded in surmounting the current difficulties", reflect the underlying 
political thinking. Libya encourages temporary migration, on a 
contractual basis22; and the Maltese government can only plan for the 
temporary settlement abroad of male workers. But that is emigration just 
the same. The only difference would be in the return period: under the 
former type of migration it was up to the emigrant to decide when to 
resettle in Malta, if at all; under contractual migration the return is 
stipulated in advance. 
Emigration would not be obstructed from Malta should the traditional 
recipient countries liberalise their immigration rules and Malta would be 
facing relatively high unemployment. Under the existing systems of 
entry, preference is awarded to immigrants with selected skills and to 
those who possess financial assets, the categories of emigrants who, 
preferably, would remain in Malta. Perhaps it was for this reason that 
financial assistance to emigrants, introduced in 1948, was restricted to 
the unskilled after 1980: the social benefits accruing from the emigration 
Of professional and highly skilled personnel were considered by 
government to be just equal to the private benefits arising to the migrants 
who were made to bear the entire expense of travel to their country of 
adoption. Since such costs would not deter highly skilled people from 
emigrating, the financial gains from pursuing such a policy would be 
minimal; they would be restricted to the value of the grant saved by the 
government. 
In sum, Maltese political leaders have responded pragmatically to the 
demographic and economic conditions in the Islands. Migration was 
strategically used by all political parties to regulate population gro)Vth 
and facilitate the steady diversification of the economy. Views on the 
emigration-investment trade-off expressed by Balogh and Seers in the 
mid-fifties proved to be impracticable at the time but become 
implementable in the late sixties when the rate of natural increase had 
declined from a high 2.4% to 0.7%. The recent interest by local politicians 
in return migration, and the apparent silence on emigration, does not 
reflect a change of views but rather reflects a change in the international 
environment to permanent settlement abroad. 
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Emigration: An Investment in a Migrant's Future 
The claim that Maltese emigrants are 'exiles abroad' rests on the 
assumption that people prefer to live and work in'their native country 
rather than elsewhere. It is argued that because of this 'natural' desire, 
the failure of economic policy makers to generate full employment is 
tantamount to the exile of emigrants who are compelled to seek work 
elsewhere. 
This interpretation of the relationship between economic activity and 
emigration is at once simplistic and narrow. First of all, it fails to place 
the emigration movement within its relevant historical context so as to 
identify the factors which gave rise to emigration. Besides, it ignores the 
fact that some individuals who are adventurous by nature are 
cosmopolitan in their attitude towards life; they would desire emigration 
for itself23. However4 even for the.non-adventurous, the decision to 
emigrate with a view of maximising welfare over a time period is 
multifaceted and should not, therefore, be constrained to only one factor, 
in this case, the desire to remain in one's native c6untry. 
Furthermore, the above interpretation endows local policymakers with 
powers which they do not possess. Economic policymakers may fail to 
generate domestic full-employment at a set of socially acceptable wage 
levels, but they cannot force people to emigrate nor can they induce them 
to leave, through heavy subsidies on travel costs, for example, unless the 
recipient countries permit them and are willing to accept the emigrants. 
Personal dissatisfaction with the domestic situation may be a necessary 
requisite to encourage a man to emigrate; but it is not sufficient to turn 
him into an emigrant. 
A man decides to emigrate after he evaluates the projected comparative 
financial and psychic gains and costs in the countries of origin and of 
possible adoption over a time period. Through emigration, a migrant 
increases the range of investment possibilities for his future; the search 
for work and alternative life styles is extended beyond the political 
boundaries of the nation-state. Therefore, emigration would condition 
personal aspirations for standards of life and work and, in turn, 
'determines' the configuration of a worker's schedule of the supply of 
effort. It may even affect significantly the overall elasticity of the 
aggregate labour supply function if it is carried out on a large scale. 
If the expectations for improved conditions of life and work vary 
directly with the probability to emigrate, then those sub-groups in a 
population which qualify for emigration would enjoy better living 
conditions. in the domestic economy. By providing them with an 
alternative source of employment and income, emigration strengthens 
their bargaining power in the labour market and renders their supply of 
\Jmrrt i)~h~d.\llt tlllStic. 
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Public policy makers in Malta tend to disregard completely this aspect 
of migration. They consider emigration as a J>hift parameter which 
merely reduces the volume of a given labour supply. Economic I?lanners 
apparently assumed that the Maltese labour force would be willing to 
work in Malta irrespective of wages paid and the conditions of 
employment offered; in other words, they assumed a perfectly inelastic 
labour supply schedule with earnings representing economic rent. They 
seem to have placed a heavy weight on the 'innate' desire to work 'at 
home' with the result that the migration elasticity of the Maltese labour 
force with respect to local socio-economic conditions was assumed to be 
very low, tending to zero 24 • This assumption is bound to be unrealistic in a 
society with a relatively long exposure to migration; but it is an implicit 
axiom on which policy makers construct their approach to emigration 
despite the fact that policies have been lately introduced to induce a 
restriction in the flow of migrant returnees2\ 
For an individual, emigration acts as a countervailing force to social 
pressure and to unemployment. A high level of unemployment, for 
example, weakens the bargaining power of a worker and impairs the 
collective strength of a trade union during the negotiations with 
employers. Emigration removes this weakness; it assumes a role similar 
to that. which the ownership of property would have on the bargaining 
power of labour26. Emigration enables the worker to be selective and, by 
reducing the general level of unemployment, it minimises tension for 
trade union negotiators. 
Wages and the conditions of emplbyment for workers eligible to 
emigrate would be better than those obtained by workers not considered 
for emigration. Thus, if only male, skilled workers are allowed to settle 
abroad, their rates of remuneration in the country of origin would have to 
improve otherwise they would leave the country. Conversely, female or 
unskilled workers could be forced to accept wages lower than 
economically justified, especially if the industries in which they work are 
characterised 'by a 'collusive monopsony' among employers, because 
alternative employment opportunities would be restricted to those 
obtainable in the domestic economy. For them the supply of effort 
sched ule is rendered relatively inelastic, if not totally inelastic, because of 
the absence of alternative employment. 
In a survey on Maltese emigration,. R. Cirillo27 reports that 44.71% of 
the emigrants interviewed had left the Islands because "they were 
dissatisfied with the economic situation in Malta" while 40.36% had been 
"attracted by the economic situation elsewhere". These emigrants had 
been gainfully occupied before departure. It may be presumed, therefore, 
they would still had been 'dissatisfied' with the situation or, at least, 
'indifferent' were it not possible for them to emigrate, but they would not 
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had voluntarily withdrawn their labour services from the domestic 
market. Their supply of effort schedule would have been fairly inelastic 
over the wage range obtained in Malta; and they would have been 
compelled to accept the terms of employment offered on the domestic 
market. But the possibility of becoming internationally mobile removed 
this constraint and enabled them to dictate the norms for pay and work 
conditions against which those forthcoming locally could becompared2H• 
It is relevant to emphasise that such comparisons are not drawn in a 
vacuum; rather they are related to a specific period. Space does not permit 
a discussion on the demographic and economic conditions which 
prevailed in the Maltese Islands over the past forty years, but it is that 
socio-economic background which was the scenario for the decision-
making of more than one hundred and thirty thousand Maltese 
emigrants29• Such a large number of Maltese, representing almost a half 
of the present population in Malta, by itself is an indication of the 
problem which the Maltese would have had to face in the absence of 
emigration. 
It is against problems of such a dimension that the validity of 
references to 'exile' has to be assessed. Indeed, it would be useful to 
analyse, in brief, those factors which enter into the decision making 
process of a prospecti ve Maltese emigrant; recourse is made to the human 
capital approach to investment since it can be handled to 'explain' the 
behaviour of both the permanent settler and the temporary migrant. 
Maltese emigration was generally non-contractual. Emigrants were free, 
indeed encouraged, to settle down in the country of their choice; a decision 
to return was theirs alone and, generally, they were not prohibited from 
resettling in the Islands. 
To make a rational decision, the prospective emigrant must evaluate 
the information he obtains on the employment opportunities in Malta 
and in the countries considered for adoption and on the respective costs of 
living. He must also consider the net financial effects of the tax and social 
welfare systems in the several countries as well as his capabilities to cope 
with the life style at home and abroad. Such informatiQn on earnings, 
employment prospects and national customs were provided free to the 
Maltese emigrant by government agencies, friends and relatives already 
settled abroad and by voluntary organisations set up for such a purpose. 
The sponsorship system of migrant selection, implemented for thirty 
years by the governments of Australia, hi. and the United States, 
ensured the free flow of information besides contributing to the 
minimisation of the negative psychic effects which the transfer of the 
emigrant between the two countries might induce. Most emigrants took a 
fairly longtime before they made up their mind:w, and many changed 
their decision after having registered with the appropriate government 
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agency and after having undergone the routine procedure of intervIew 0::>, 
medical check-ups and'the acquisition of a work permifll. 
Given this information, the prospective emigrant would decide to leave 
Malta'if the net sum of the discounted flow of monetary and subjective 
gains and costs is positive. By applying this criterion to several, 
countries,the emigrant would select his future country of adoption. For 
anyone country, and for a single person, the decision making criterion 
may be represented by the following relationship: 
'T 
V(S) = (f e-rt(EY(F)-EY(O»)tdt-(C+K» 
, d' 
T -r't ~ 
+( f e (Y ps - Cp s)t dt) <: 0 ... (1) 
d ' 
subject to: (i) the in'dividual qualifies for entry, if quotas are applied; 
(ii) there are no political or health objections to emigration from ,his 
country to the desired country of adoption; 
(iii) return migrants are welcome in their country of origin 
(iv) tr·ansport is available 
where: (V)S = the Present Value of the net "welfare flow" for a migrant 
Y = Net Disposable Income 
E = A probability coefficient for employment anp. earnirigs 
o = Country of Origin ' 
.F = Country of Adoption 
C Costs, of Passage 
K Costs of training undertaken with the specific intent of qualifying for 
a work permit abroad. 
Yps = Net Psychic Income i.e. the satisfaction of living a life of one's 
choice at home and abroad 
Cps = Net Psychic Costs i.e. the strain and tension arising frotnliving in 
the ~ome country ~md abroad. ' 
r,r' = discount rates 
c d = Time of departure 
T = Retirement age or some other arbitrary date which could even be that 
given by life expectancy. ' 
The individual would decide in favour of emigration ifV(S) >0. The fact 
that costs of passage amounted to only LMIO per person, since they were 
subsidised, and the free provision of crash preparation courses by 
government and private organisations, reduced the monetary cost 
component, (C+ K), to practically zero. Monetary considerations, 
therefore, focused solely on the probability of being employed at given 
wages in Malta and on the probability of finding work abroad. 
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Eq. (1) implies that even if the monetary gainis nil, emigration would still 
be favoured if the second term is positive, that is, if net psychic income 
exceeds net psychic costs. Th~s would be the. case of the "escapee 
migrant",. a person· who is dissatisfied with. the socio-political 
environment in which he lives. 
Eq. (1) establishes the criteria which guide' a person to decide whether 
to emigrate; but it does not determine the timing of departure. Departure 
depends on administrative procedures which would reflect, in: part, the 
policies regulating recruitment implemented at the time. Hence the 
significance of the four constraints to which eq.(l) is subjected. They 
identify the factors which make effective a migrant's decision to leave his 
country; they turn desired emigration into actual emigration, the one 
recorded in official migration statistics. Emigration data record 
departures and not the volume of designated emigrants; therefore, 
analysis of emigration trends based on offici~l data cannot be 
meaningfully undertaken unless additional information on the policies 
pursued by recipient countries and on transport availability is obtained 
and accounted for in any 'explanation'. 
Eq.(l) may be adapted to render the 'family' as the basic decision-
making unit. For a parent, the motive to emigrate may not be solely better 
prospects of employment abroad. The present job and income may be 
satisfactory, given the,earnings levels and distribution in the country of 
origin. Yet, if the anticipated employment conditions in the medium run 
appeq.r adverse to the children's interest, emigration by the family would 
be seriously considered. In this case, eq(l) could'be modified to include 
. other considerations such as the possible monetary income arising from 
the productive employment outside the home of the wife or a child and 
q.ccount for the possible additional strain on family'cohesion .which the 
family could be expected to experience abroad. The four constraints 
introduced above assume greater relevance in the emigr,ation of the 
family, particularly the application of quotas by the recipient countries, 
which may induce a short-term separation of some members from the 
family. Generally, however, traditional settlement countries, chosen by. 
Maltese, accorded priority to close family members under a specific policy 
of uniting families abroad. Transport is no longer a problem for Maltese 
emigrants, .although it used to be in the forties i:md early fifties. 
Problems of adjustment, represented by psychic cost, eps, in eq.(l), 
should not in any way be minimised. Problems of adaptation are 
associated with most 'movements', be they inter-regional, inter-groups, 
and, evide~tly, international. They tend to generate, in this last instance, 
the return flow of emigrants registered in official migration statistics in 
Malta as migrant returnees up to 1974. The 'uprooting' of an individual 
from a given environment is a characteristic of mobility; indeed in many 
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instances, public policy deliberately aims at inducing or, at times, forcing 
people to change their work and living environment by rendering them 
industrially and socially mobile. Such moves could be considered 'exiles' 
from a given way of life: from a rural to an urban environment; Nom self-
employment to wage employment; from a service industry to 
manufacturing, and so on. All such changes involve adaptation and 
some persons find it very difficult to adapt. The 'exile' characteristic of 
emigration from 'the Maltese ~ay of life' is, therefore, a reflection of the 
general characteristic of any mobility; any differences between various 
types of mobility become ones of degree rather than substance. 
The argument supporting the 'exile hypothesis of emigration' is 
apparently based entirely on the problems faced by emigrants to adapt 
themselves to the conditions abroad. But this factor is only one in a series 
of important parameters which have to be considered by prospective 
emigrants; hence, our observation that the 'exile hypothesis' 
oversimplifies the decision-making process leading to emigration. 
"Short-term failures", those emigrants who return within a few months 
of departure, should be distinguished from the emigrants who intended 
at the outset to resettle in their native country after working fQr some 
years abroad, and, also distinguished from those emigrants who may be 
compelled to return home for family reasons. For temporary migrants, 
emigration is the means through which they expect to improve their 
social standipg in their society by accumulating savings abroad32• 
Although no specific time limit need be determined in advance by the 
migrant an array of time options can be derived by solving an equation 
similar to eq.(2). The present value of planned savings depend on the 
expected income and costs abroad, foreign currency exchange 
movements, passage costs and a discount factor, So ifthe emigrant has a 
specific quantum of savings in mind, eq.(2) may be solved accordingly for 
t, given SP, r, the exchange rate, and the flow of' annual savings. 
Iriformation on these parameters would be available to the emigrant. 
T 
f _rt(EY(F)-EP(F))tdt -(C+K)) SP = e (c;/Cj) 
d 
where: 
SP = Planned Savings 
EP(F) = Costs of living abroad 
(ci I cj) = Rate of exchange 
EY(F), C and K as defined in eq.(l) 
.•. (2) 
C and K tended to zero under the Passage Assistance Scheme while the 
fixed parity of the Maltese Lira and the Australian .dollar to the £ 
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Sterling33, up to the sixties eliminated capital losses or gains, and relat(~d 
worries, which arise from exchange rate fluctuations. This factor become 
important in the seventies while, in the eighties, trqnsport costs would 
have to be incorporated by some categories of emigrants. The net result of 
changes in the Passage Assistance Scheme and the fluctuating exchange 
rates could affect the time required to attain ·a savings target. If a time 
limit is set in advance, then the emigrant would have to operate on the 
income and cost parameters: increase income through secondary 
employment or reduce consumption. 
A decision to emigrate is taken in the best interest of the emigrant. 
Whether it benefits the non-migrant population, and should therefore be 
subsidised from public funds, is another matter. But it is important to 
consider the two issues separately if constructive policies on migration 
are to be devised. . 
Summary 
Public policy makers in Malta, irrespective of their political beliefs, 
have adopted emigration as a supporting strategy to ease social tension 
and assist in the diversification process of the Maltese economy. Any 
disagreements among economic advisers and, in turn, among .economic 
planners did not refer to the strategy as such but to the volume of 
emigration. However, in legal, international migration aimed at 
permanent settlement, it is the recipient country which specifies the 
terms of entry and nor the country of origin. After 1975, the immigration 
rules of the countries which received Maltese emigrants constrained 
emigration from Malta forcing local policy makers to turn their attention 
to return migration. However, emigration would not be impeded if the 
conditions for entry are relaxed by the recipient countries and if the 
expansioD; rate of the Maltese economy remains below that required to 
absord a growing labour force. 
Emigration should be considered as an adjustment mechanism 
through which the migrant, and his family, maximise welfare over a 
period. This view is valid for the permanent settler and for the temporary 
migrant. The correlation of emigration with exile distorts the nature of 
the emigration process, and fails to recognise that adaptation is related to 
all types of mobility and not just emigration. Besides it totally ignores the 
historical background to Maltese emigration of th" forty years. 
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NOTES: 
1. Development Plan (or Malta 1973-80; Supplement, Malta, Office of the Prime Minister, 
October 1977, page 51. 
2. S€e King (1980) and Delia (1981). 
:3. Zammit (198:.3), p.9. 
4. Delia (1982a). 
5. A local politician recently accused his political adversaries of sending 40000 Maltese in 
'exile' as a result of "bad decisions when in Government". However, a few weeks before 
he was exhorting Maltese youths to emigrate to Libya to enable Government to succeed 
in surmounting current difficulties. See: The Times, Malta, Friday June 1, 1984, p. 20. 
and The Times, Malta, Friday December 7, 1984, p.24. 
6. Dudley Seers, who was a proponent of the second option in the fifties, recently observed 
that "Anyway, the opportunities for large scale migration have mostly disappeared, 
through tightening of controls in the recipient countries, except for temporary labour 
permits in countries of the Middle East... (and even these governments are increasingly 
apprehensive about their heavy dependence on foreign labour)". Seers (1982), p. 77. 
7. Schuster (1950), p. xiv and p.xvi. 
8. Family migration was also encouraged by the Catholic Church Authorities in Malta in 
order to safeguard the unity of the migrant's family. 
9. M.L.P., Malta l·Ewwel u Qabel KoUox, 1953. 
10. Stolper et. al (1964). 
11. Balogh and Seers (1955), par. 10 to 21. The arguments for a lower emigration were not in 
any way new for Malta. Similar arguments had been used by opponents of emigration in 
the nineteenth century. See Price (1954), Chapter 3. 
12. Report of the Department of Labour, Social Welfare and Emigration, Malta, 1957, p.lO. 
13. An evaluation of the Balogh·Seers hypothesis on the relevance of emigration for the 
Maltese economy is given in Delia (1982b) and (1984). 
14. Balogh and Seers (1955), par. 20. 
15. Seers (1982), p. 77. 
16. Development Plan (or Malta' 1973·1980, p. 109. 
17. An estimate of return migration- before 1975 is given in Deiia (1981). Refer to 
Demographic Revieu' of the Maltese Islands, T. 32, for the criteria appied to 
enumerate return mil,rrants. 
18. Similar attempts to discourage return migration were made by the Labour government in 
1957. The Minister for Emigration had admonished the relatives of emigrant sin Malta not 
to encourage them to come back "by painting a too rosy picture of the conditions over 
here." Report of the Department of Labour, Social Welfare and Emigration, 1957, p. 10. 
19. Ripe (or Change: Nationalist Government Programme (or the Eighties, Malta, Nationalist 
Party, 1981, p. 28. 
20. A world survey of present policies on permanent mil,rration is published in United 
Nations: Department of International and Social Affairs (1982). 
21. The Times, Malta, June 1, 1984, p. 20. 
22. United Nations, (1982), p. 45. 
23. Cirillo (1960), page 60, reports that 7% of the inteviewees in his survey had emigrated "J 
in search of adventure". Dench (1975) p. 260, points out that he found 26'1[, of the London 
Maltese who claimed to have left Malta for the same reason and in order to escape. 
24. A government minister was reported to have said that he preferred the Maltese to be 
unemployed in Malta than to emigrate "so that they would be at hand when the 
economy starts growing again". The Times, Malta, March 30, 1983, p.3. 
25. It seems that policy makers in Malta may be against the 'exile' of the first-time emigrants; 
but once emigrants are 'in exile', they ought to remain there! 
26. Preiser (1952). 
27. Cirillo (1959). Table 6, p. 60. 
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28. Without emigration, a simple labour supply function would represent labour supply as , 
function of real wage and unemploynwnt: S(lJ f(w p: U) . 
Emigration modifies this function by reducing uIll'mplo~'nlL'nt and introducing th 
possibility of work, and income, abroad. 
S(L) = g(w/p; U; M) 
= h((w/p)F. u) 
(w!p)O' 
Where F = abroad; 0= country of oril"rin; U' = post migration unemploynwnt mtC's. 
29. See Delia (1982b) for an analysis of the demol,,'Yaphic and economic background. 
30. Cirillo (1959), p.5. 
31. Report of the Department of Labour, Emigration and Social Welfare, Malta, 1970, p.:; I. 
32. If emigrants believe that social classes are determined by wealth and conspicuous 
consumption, then financial gains will represent a rise along the social ladder. Zammit 
(1974) p. 38. 
33. Australia was the first priority of Maltese families England was generally the choice of 
young, single, males. 
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